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Abstract: The way in which companies, research centres and educational 
institutions are organised and structured may provide a competitive advantage 
for commercialisation, in particular if companies are dependent on the 
deployment of complementary assets and capabilities by third parties.  
This paper presents the case of the Australian Centre for Plant Functional 
Genomics (ACPFG), a private agricultural biotechnology (agbiotech) company 
specialising in early stage Research and Development (R&D) to produce 
superior adapted cereal varieties, tolerant to abiotic stress conditions such as 
drought, frost, salt, or mineral toxicity, all of which have a direct and negative 
impact on plant growth and crop productivity. 
The organisational structure of the company has been influenced and 
shaped by Government policy, shareholders expectations and trends in the 
agbiotech industrial organisation. It has proved attractive to potential alliance 
partners for collaborative R&D and commercialisation.  
We present the ACPFG as a new business model to fund basic research 
and facilitate technology transfer. 
Keywords: Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics (ACPFG); 
agricultural biotechnology (agbiotech); commercialisation; industry 
consolidation; intellectual property; transaction costs; strategic alliance; 
licensing; technology transfer; complementary assets; core competences. 
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1 Introduction 
Turning innovations into commercial success has been identified as being key to 
Australia’s future prosperity (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001). During 1999, the 
Australian Research Council (ARC), an Australian Government investment body   
to foster excellence and partnerships in research in all fields of science and the   
Grains Research and Development Corporation (GRDC), a world leading grains research 
funder, sponsored workshops to explore new opportunities in agricultural genomics. The 
aim was to identify a research opportunity which would have mutual benefits to the ARC 
and the GRDC. The Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics (ACPFG) 
presented a research and business opportunity to both parties.  
The ACPFG is a new research centre with a commercial focus funded by a number of 
government and semi-government bodies. Its key imperative is to conduct high quality 
genetic research to develop superior adapted cereal varieties tolerant to abiotic stress 
conditions such as drought, frost, salt, or mineral toxicity, all of which have a direct and 
negative impact on plant growth and crop productivity.  
Prior to the establishment of ACPFG, it was recognised that commercialisation of 
technology within a conventional research structure may be difficult due to a variety of 
issues including organisational structure, culture and ownership of Intellectual Property 
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Rights and prioritising commercial applications of R&D. Conventional research 
structures have excellent research as their core competence but the application of 
innovations may be a secondary consideration.  
For ACPFG, investment opportunities were also important considerations. The 2001 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on R&D 
Productivity Growth (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001) showed that 
whilst an increase in 1% of business expenditure generates an additional 0.13% increase 
in productivity growth, foreign business investment generates a 0.44% increase. The task 
was therefore to establish ACPFG as a world-class research establishment but with a 
structure that would facilitate commercialisation of technological innovation and the 
ability to leverage government and private sector funds, infrastructure and know-how in 
particular, from foreign sources. Given the large number of possible structures to choose 
from, which structure would be the most likely to lead to commercial success? The 
funders of ACPFG decided to adopt a private industry model so that it could capture 
leverage opportunities and maximise the likelihood of commercial success. 
2 Shareholders 
All shareholders wanted to establish a world-class research centre in the area of plant 
functional genomics. The desired outcomes of the cash funders of ACPFG varied. One 
funder required internationally recognised research as evidenced through a series of 
criteria including publications and, whilst commercial application of that research was 
important, it was not its primary aim. On the other hand, the farmer funded body wanted 
positive outcomes for Australian farmers as it provides money for research where the 
horizon for commercial return is too far away for funding by commercial companies. 
Another funder desired local employment and increased economic activity within the 
local region.  
The key problem was to develop a structure that would address each shareholder’s 
requirements. A working group was established in 2002 to establish ACPFG and a 
project manager was appointed. 
3 Shareholding   
Once all shareholders agreed the ACPFG would be established, a mechanism was 
introduced to ensure shareholding in the company reflected actual contributions. 
Importantly, as company equity was the only means of shareholders influencing the 
strategic direction of ACPFG, equity holdings in ACPFG needed to be accurate.  
A model was developed by which shareholdings were valued. It was decided that 
initially, 100 shares would be issued in the company. Each participant was issued an 
initial allocation of shares in proportion to their envisaged project inputs. These inputs 
were calculated looking forward five years and both cash and in-kind inputs were taken 
into account and given equal status. An adjustment mechanism was also devised 
whereby, in future years, further shares would be issued in proportion to the actual 
contributions made. Hence at the end of any year, shareholding should remain in 
proportion to the contributions from respective shareholders. 
ACPFG was finally incorporated as a company limited by shares in November 2002. 
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4  People resources  
ACPFG’s management structure is designed to identify, capture and commercialise 
innovation within a research environment. An experienced professional board governs 
the company where directors were chosen for their expertise and experience in research, 
commercial, or market skills (Figure 1).  
Figure 1  Organisational structure of the ACPFG 






Funder 2 - 27%
Researcher 1 - 22%
Researcher 2 - 10%
Researcher 3 - 2%




The Board is not representational of individual shareholders; the members are chosen 
jointly by the shareholders for their skills rather than to represent the interests of 
particular shareholders. This ensures the Board acts in the best interests of the company. 
An Executive Management Committee is responsible for overseeing projects and 
monitoring progress of research, and IP and commercialisation skills are used to support 
the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) role of decision-making and strategic direction of 
the company.  
The original shareholders’ objective to develop the company’s core competence in 
the discipline of plant functional genomics, favoured the appointment of a CEO 
experienced in research management and training, rather than commercialisation of 
agbiotech. An internationally renowned scientist of high calibre with extensive research 
and industry networks was chosen as the preferred leader for the company. By focusing 
on recognised agronomic problems, the CEO could provide the research direction 
required for development of commercial solutions applicable to a global market. In 
addition, this choice of leadership was intended to facilitate the transition from a 
university and research publication culture, to a commercially orientated R&D company 
as the majority of scientific personnel were university employees seconded to a   
private company.  
ACPFG’s roots lie in public sector research. The task of converting it to a commercial 
ethos presents the challenges described in Schein (1996). Schein’s (1996) ‘Operator 
Culture’ is reflected accurately in ACPFG’s international team of scientists. It is a 
complex, flexible network relying on communication, trust and teamwork to bring 
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projects to fruition. Partly due to its flat hierarchical structure, ACPFG is a long way 
from having an ‘Executive Culture’ more usual in commercial organisations. Typically in 
the Executive Culture the CEO is preoccupied with finances and views human resources  
as a cost rather than a capital investment. In ACPFG, the CEO has not adopted an 
exclusive financial viewpoint. Instead, he plays a pivotal role in the company’s R&D 
direction by maintaining an active research programme and views the company’s key 
resource as scientific personnel.  
To bridge the gap between Stein’s three stated cultures, staff members who combine 
engineering or scientific backgrounds with business and commercialisation qualifications 
and experience support the CEO’s vision. The resultant hybrid Operator/Executive 
culture, places a greater emphasis on developing a system of quality control whereby 
personnel are governed by an independent board which in turn is accountable to the 
company’s shareholders. This is a structure that the commercial world understands and is 
familiar with. 
5  Intellectual Property (IP) 
Intellectual Property (IP) agency agreements contract a number of Australian universities 
to carry out R&D on behalf of ACPFG. These agencies are also ACPFG shareholders. As 
each research programme develops IP, that IP vests immediately in ACFPG (Figure 2). 
This is a key element of the commercialisation strategy.  
Figure 2 IP  ownership 
ACPFG
Researcher 1 Researcher 4 Researcher 2 Researcher 3
Partner
IP ownership
Intellectual Property Agency Agreements
The company has the ability to sell or out-license any technology as ACPFG owns all IP 
arising from the programme as developed from the four interdependent research nodes 
(Figure 2). Unconstrained IP dealings, and having only one entity to deal with, has 
proved attractive for third parties to consider ACPFG as a potential commercial partner. 
This is evidenced by the number and quality of commercial organisations now in 
dialogue with ACPFG. 
ACPFG is forming long-term relationships for collaborative R&D and 
commercialisation. Industry dynamics and its own capability portfolio were significant 
determinants in identifying partners. ACPFG relies on its core competence and location 
in an internationally renowned agri-food cluster, the South Australian Waite Precinct, to 
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develop ‘strategic architecture’ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Being able to identify which 
core competencies to develop, and their constituent technologies, has prioritised company 
resources to focus on early stage technologies.  
Proprietary technologies are used as a competitive tool to leverage negotiations   
and can provide major agbiotech companies with a competitive advantage to expand  
market potential through collaborative R&D and commercial licensing agreements.   
Out-licensing the technology to third parties to form a long-term ‘strategic’ alliance   
for collaborative R&D, and commercialisation is a preferred strategy due to the long 
lead-time for product development and limited life of patent protection. Close 
collaboration with organisations can significantly reduce the time to market for   
new products. 
The platform nature of ACPFG technology affords several licensing options, which 
suit the company’s financial and non-financial objectives. ACPFG has decided to   
out-license its technology, based upon application by crops, with no geographic 
limitation. Thus, monetary returns will be had from licensing into the global market, 
faster development is achieved via collaboration with much larger organisations and 
technologies can also diffuse into local industry. 
Out-licensing technology should also contribute to maintaining a steady cashflow. 
This decreases the reliance on public sector funding and leaves open the option of using 
the technology in new ways for different applications, not yet discovered. 
Another reason for out-licensing IP to large agbiotech companies is that the 
technology can be bundled together to create synergies with other product features. These 
‘stacked traits’ can provide greater returns on investment than if ACPFG attempted to 
market its IP in isolation. 
The other option available is sale of the IP, however this divests the centre of any 
control over its development and diffusion into the Australian grains industry. This would 
be undesirable for one of its major shareholders. 
A corollary of the agency agreement provisions is that discretion over publication  
of results lies with ACPFG. This has not been a disadvantage to knowledge 
dissemination. In fact, during its short-life span, ACPFG has contributed to expanding 
public knowledge through: 
•  over 120 publications in refereed journals  
•  more than 70 presentations to international conferences  
•  numerous workshops and conferences organised by ACPFG  
•  an extensive community education programme.  
6 Commercialisation 
Structure, staffing and ongoing management of ACPFG have revolved around developing 
R&D core competences in the agbiotech supply chain. Its organisational culture also 
reflects this. Translating core competencies and organisational culture into successful 
commercialisation, while meeting the varied objectives of its shareholders, is predicated 
upon actions that bring to bear Kay’s (1993) conclusion: 
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“Corporate success derives from a competitive advantage, which is based on 
distinctive capabilities, which is most often derived from the unique character 
of a firm’s relationships with its suppliers, customers, or employees, and which 
is precisely identified and applied to relevant markets.” 
7 Commercially  focused 
ACPFG is funded to develop abiotic stress tolerance in wheat and barley crops. It is 
unlikely it could become self-funding based on commercialisation of wheat and barley 
research outcomes in Australia alone. It will therefore be important to secure a dividend 
from any improvements made to major commercial crops in other regions. Revenues 
from such international exploitation of ACPFG outcomes would provide cash for 
developing further outcomes aimed primarily at Australian farmers but secondarily for 
crops in other markets. 
ACPFG’s outcomes may have application to crops for which a well-developed   
and valuable market exists for new varieties and where models for margin capture are 
well-defined.  
The obvious choices of alternative market targets are the maize market in the USA 
and the rice market in the USA and Asia. Maize and rice are also cereals and genomics 
solutions developed in wheat and barley have a good chance of success in these crops due 
to phylogenic similarities. The maize crop in the USA is over 14 times as large as the 
Australian wheat crop and there are opportunities for ACPFG to transfer its knowledge in 
wheat and barley into maize (USDA, 2005). Europe is not being considered at present 
due to regulatory and consumer related impediments but it does represent a very large 
potential market. 
It is also unrealistic to expect that the centre has, or could easily develop, the requisite 
capabilities to engage in full commercialisation on its own. Due to trends in industry 
structure and transaction risks mentioned below, ACPFG is seeking to commercialise its 
technologies through licences, where the licensee is also effectively a strategic partner 
rather than an arms-length counter party. This leverages the centre’s capabilities and 
affords the partner a form of outsourced innovation that is linked to its own system, while 
retaining flexibility for the respective parties to pursue their own objectives. 
In fact, ‘prior related knowledge’ can be a critical resource for a company attempting 
to commercialise a new technology and an important reason why firms with similar and 
overlapping capabilities collaborate with each other (Davenport and Miller, 2000). 
8  External agbiotech market  
As has been explained earlier, the ACPFG needs to gain income from commercialisation 
of IP it develops in order to help fund the aims and objectives of its various stakeholders. 
It is initially developing IP that has application to specific sectors of the seed industry. 
Those organisations that are major players in the seed industry are, therefore, the 
potential commercialisation agent of ACPFG’s IP (Figure 3). Who are they? How strong 
is their bargaining position? What is happening in their industry – how profitable is it? 
What are their interests, both now and in the future? These are questions that must be 
considered when the commercialisation strategy for ACPFG is developed. 
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Figure 3  Flowchart of delivery of product to market  
ACPFG
(Gene identification and isolation. Proof of function and concept)
↓
Plant Breeders
 (Breed cereal plants, selects suitable lines, produce small seed quantity)
↓
Seed Companies
(Grow commercial quantities of seed)
↓
Growers
(Grow cereal, harvest grain and sell in/export to commodities markets)
↓
Grain/Fresh Food Markets
(Storage and purchase site)
↓
Distribution Network






(Processors and manufacturers sell to grocery wholesalers)
Note:  Agbiotech companies usually have acquired plant breeding and  
crop seed companies 
9  Agricultural industry consolidation 
The agricultural production industry has been impacted by the emergence of 
biotechnology during the last 20 years and major restructuring has occurred because of  
it. Initially several large chemical firms including Monsanto, Dow and DuPont moved 
into plant biotechnology to create agronomic systems companies. They acquired the 
seemingly successful agbiotech research companies and large national seed companies in 
the USA to create vertically integrated firms capable of discovering and commercialising 
innovations in agricultural technology.  
This industry consolidation happened very rapidly and was notable for the high prices 
paid for both research and seed firms, by the chemical companies. The industry is also 
now characterised by a web of alliances that span basic R&D through to marketing and is 
also highly concentrated. 
By 1998, the top five ‘gene’ companies (AstraZeneca, DuPont, Monsanto, Novartis 
and Aventis) accounted for nearly two-thirds of the global pesticides market, almost one 
quarter of the commercial seed market and virtually all of the transgenic seed market. 
Additionally, the top ten seed companies controlled around 23% of the $23 billion 
worldwide seed trade with the top three companies (DuPont, Monsanto and Novartis) 
having around a 20% share (Johnson and Melkonyan, 2003). 
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10  The benefits of consolidation of the industry 
The change in the structure of the agricultural inputs industry is suggested to be a 
response to the new opportunity for tailoring the genetic makeup of crops. To capitalise 
on this, a firm needs an array of specialised capabilities in plant genetics: tools for plant 
genetic transformation, genes and elite crop germplasm, all of which have been 
patentable in the US, and other western markets, since the 1980s. These intellectual assets 
complement one another for a particular crop: more of one will lead to an increase in the 
value of the other two (Graff et al., 2003). There is, therefore, an incentive for firms to 
gain access to all three which is possible through in-licensing or buying technologies. 
However, if the transaction costs are high or not straightforward, it is simpler just to 
acquire them and consolidate them into one organisation. 
The structure of the agbiotech industry has evolved differently than other   
research-intensive ones (Graff et al., 2003). The pharmaceutical biotech industry, for 
example, has had a large number of individual firms that specialised in R&D and earned 
their revenue through various licensing arrangements (Majewski, 1998). The US 
semiconductor industry has evolved in an opposite way with there being a substantial 
disaggregation and new firms have appeared that specialise in the intellectual process of 
chip design and who outsource the manufacturing and other commercialisation processes 
(Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). 
11  The theory of asset complementarities 
A further explanation of the benefits of consolidation of the industry is given by the 
Theory of Asset Complementarities where intellectual assets are intentionally managed 
and coordinated (Teece, 1986). When owners of different assets, like IP, manage   
their (research) outputs independently of one another without taking into account the 
synergistic effects that their production has on the holders of other, complementary 
assets, the total potential value of the assets, both private and social, may not be realised. 
This is particularly true in times of rapid technological change, where R&D investment  
is high and where the development of industries and markets is seen as complex and 
uncertain (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). One response to this situation is to arrange that 
all assets are subject to one management regime, that is, in a single firm. However, this  
is not the only solution and there are downsides. As a firm grows in size, it must 
increasingly manage transactions between internal assets and this leads to increasing 
bureaucracy and cost. The alternative of managing external transactions between assets is 
inherently problematic, too.  
Graff et al. (2003) use the Theory of Asset Complementarities to seek to explain firm 
boundaries and industry consolidation in the agricultural biotech industry. Their findings 
support the hypothesis that the industry’s restructuring and concentration over the past  
20 years has been causally driven by the attempt by major firms to achieve coordination 
between complementary intellectual assets. 
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12 Other  explanations 
There are yet other reasons why consolidation of the agbiotech industry has happened 
such as the erection of barriers to entry, achieving market power, achieving economies of 
scale in R&D and access to global markets. However, Graff et al. (2003) assert that none 
of these reasons by themselves would have generated the concentration of IP holdings 
and of the industry. 
Johnson and Melkonyan (2003) examine the apparent motivations for the 
consolidation and resulting concentration in the agricultural biotech industry. They 
studied the history and behaviour of four of the major players in the industry: DuPont, 
Monsanto, Novartis and Dow Agrosciences. They developed a model which appears   
to explain well the consolidation patterns in the biotech industry; “the key results   
derive from the benefits of coordinated actions, distinction between transferable and   
non-transferable payoffs and the substitutability, complementarity and the importance of 
managers’ non-contractible investments”. It was observed that with the exception of Dow 
Chemical, which did not have a pharmaceutical business, the acquisitions by these big 
firms anticipated the creation of value or synergies between pharmaceutical and 
agricultural businesses. However, this interdependence and synergy did not materialise. 
The two companies with the biggest pharmaceutical businesses made decisions to   
either spin these off as separate activities or to divest them. All four firms seem to 
support consolidation as a means of gaining market access and substitutability. Market 
expansion has been achieved by acquiring firms that were already well established in 
desirable markets.  
13 Business  realities 
At the turn of the century, Monsanto was arguably the world’s most controversial 
company, praised by those who saw a future of environmentally friendly farming and 
healthier diets via high-tech crops, and damned by others who considered them promoters 
of ecological destruction and corporate control of the global food supply. Under   
siege from anti-GM protestors and heavily indebted after its $5.3 billion acquisition 
spree, Monsanto was bought by Pharmacia, US drug company, for its successful 
pharmaceutical division, Searle.  
In 2000, Pharmacia floated 15% of Monsanto on the stock market and announced 
plans to spin-off the rest by the end of that year. In 2002, Pharmacia itself was bought  
by Pfizer, a US rival and the Monsanto sale was enacted. This caused Monsanto to 
become a different entity. In 2000, Hendrik Verfaillie replaced Robert Shapiro as CEO, 
who had formulated the strategy of focusing on the ‘life sciences’ and the synergies  
from combining farming, food and pharmaceuticals, as described earlier. Not only did 
Monsanto lose its drug-making arm but it also shed its profitable NutraSweet business. 
Within agriculture, it narrowed its interest to four key crops: soybeans, maize, wheat and 
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Pharmacia gave the firm much-needed breathing space, assuming most of its debt and 
leaving it to get on with cutting costs and integrating the many seed companies that it 
bought in the late 1990s. Rivals such as DuPont had also to cut costs in order to meet 
profit-margin targets. This was particularly true in the crop-protection business as global 
sales of chemical pesticides were expected to shrink by more than 10% to $11.8 billion 
by 2004.  
The agrochemical and seed industry is under pressure on several fronts, including 
persistently low commodity prices and industry consolidation. The second of these has 
created bigger competitors in crop chemicals. Another factor is the economic problems of 
Argentina, a big consumer of chemicals. Although crop chemicals still accounted for 
almost 70% of Monsanto’s revenues, their prospects were dimming because the firm’s 
best-selling herbicide, called Roundup, went off-patent. Monsanto saw its future in 
innovative seeds and genomics. The firm was backing this with money: in 2001, 83% of 
Monsanto’s $550 million investment in research and development went into seeds and 
biotechnology, compared with an industry average of 29% (Economist, 2002). 
An analysis of the industry that does R&D for the seed industry, using Porter’s (1988) 
five-forces model would suggest that the ‘buyers’, in this case the large seed companies, 
are very powerful. It would also suggest that this industry will be competitive and not 
highly profitable. 
14  What does this all mean for the ACPFG’s commercialisation strategy? 
For a variety of reasons as described above, the route to major markets for the 
commercial application of ACPFG’s initial, intended IP will have to be through major 
agbiotech seed firms. These are in a strong position and needing to extract sufficient 
profits to pay-off the large investment required in research. In addition, as many   
key technologies are owned by dominant US agbiotech companies and there is 
competition to patent genes for future products, companies and public sector institutions 
are partnering to coordinate R&D strategy with merger and acquisition strategy, to access 
complementary intellectual assets and decrease transactions costs (Graff et al., 2003).  
Additionally, the degree to which IP transfer arrangements allow the ACPFG to 
benefit from research conducted by other agbiotech companies, or its agents, will have an 
impact on the ways in which the ACPFG can benefit its stakeholders. All of these 
considerations in the choice of commercialisation route and possible partners have 
implications for the way the ACPFG is structured and managed. The overall strategy for 
the development of the ACPFG must allow for these considerations. 
15 Conclusion 
The ACPFG was created in an environment where public sector funding for research 
activities is increasingly difficult to secure, and there is increasing pressure on 
universities to secure ‘third stream’ funding through commercialisation. Further,   
there is strong evidence that the wide cultural and operational divide between   
research and market-driven organisations remains an impediment to science and 
technology commercialisation.  
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ACPFG represents a new business model to fund basic research and facilitate 
technology transfer into the world market. It brings together its shareholders’ multiple 
objectives: financial and non-financial. The embodiment of the business model is seen in 
the company’s organisational structure, single ownership of IP, business and commercial 
strategies, in addition to staffing considerations to enable various desired outcomes from 
the R&D programmes to be achieved.  
The ACPFG has been established to foster excellence in plant genomics and 
commercialise its research outcomes. By developing core competence, ACPFG   
can capture leverage business opportunities via a private industry model to maximise  
the likelihood of commercial success and become partially self-funding through 
commercialisation of proprietary IP. 
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